Typically true statements in the form of facts are the result of two kinds of devices: technological devices and human devices. Both of these devices are the means by which scientist produce their beliefs, claims/statements, and compete with each other (and each other‘s statements), defeat each other, and remove the contextual dimensions. Human devices are any non-technological means which scientist employ that directly contribute to the statements they make.

Aside from lawyers and politicians, rhetorical/persuasive or human devices are used by scientist often. Latour’s naïve anthropologist in chapter 2 of Laboratory Life describes how the participants he/she studied worked to transform statements into more “fact-like” statements (LL pg73-84). The anthropologist at the end of chapter 2 suggests that by using literary inscriptions, photographs, and diagrams a reader of a statement is persuaded into accepting the transformation of a statement into a “fact-like” statement (LL pg88). Additionally, scientific writing is usually extremely technical and does not make use of personal pronouns. In doing so, scientific writing makes the author invisible, and predetermines the reader, which adds to the validity of the claims made.

In addition to using various kinds of rhetorical devices of persuasion such as different kinds of statements and ways of making those statements that render the authors invisible and make their statements appear more fact-like, often times scientist simply eliminate the competition that other scientist pose. For example, in chapter 3 of Latour’s Laboratory Life, the historian’s deconstruction of a fact shows the changes in context that occurred over time. One such change is the redefining of a field into a subspecialty. This redefinition allows the scientist to redefine standards and methodology such that the use of new equipment that is expensive is necessary. The costly equipment eliminates competition by eliminating scientist who are not sufficiently funded (LL pg122). A similar phenomenon is described in H.M. Collins’ introduction to his work The Golem. Collins explains how Einstein’s Theory of Relativity in combination with Einstein as a figure of authority, sparked contention within the physics community that eventually led to a refining of standards, which dictated what counted as valid. Once the “culture of life in the physics community changed”, previous experiments that may have been considered relevant, were no longer so (The Golem pg42).

The elimination of competition, as described by both Latour and Collins, is the result of a human device. This human device is the strategic use of the political and social dimensions of science. In Latour’s case study of TRF(H) in Laboratory Life, the political and social work done by Guillemin and Schally was complaining that the field was outdated, that claims were unfounded, and that elegant hypotheses substituted for facts (LL pg122). Their complaining directly contributed to the redefinition of a subspecialty, elimination of scientists who did not meet the new standards, and to the production of scientific facts.

Collins in his work The Golem is more explicit. An interpretation of Collins work in The Golem is that the success of a statement depends on the success of its authors. When an author of a theory or statement becomes extremely successful, their statements, and other statements either derived or implicated, also become successful. This is extremely obvious in the social sciences, but not in the “hard” sciences. Nonetheless, according to Collins, upon close examination we see that because of Einstein’s figure of authority and genius, his theory was successful. After consensus (which is the result of human and technological devices) was established regarding the validity of Einstein’s theory, various confirming data was reported. Discrepancies that previously plagued the work of other researchers, and inhibited them from drawing conclusions supporting Einstein, disappeared (The Golem pg53). Collins writes that scientific consensus moved from the center occupied by Einstein’s theory, and spread in all directions from that center. This was all the result of “agreement to agree about new things” (The Golem pg54). These new things primarily were derived or implicated from the center, which was the result of possibly part genius, and mostly the social and political dimensions of science.

With that we turn to technological devices. Technological devices used in science range from measuring devices (e.g. test-tubes, mass-spectrometers), experimental devices (e.g. prisms, lasers, gravitational radiation detectors), and one can even argue that the tap water in the laboratory is a technological device. We can broadly define technological devices as any non-human means which scientist employ that directly contribute to the statements they make in the ways discussed earlier. In this way, for example, the tap water is a technological device because it directly contributes to the work in the laboratory, and hence the statements produced by the scientists. If the tap water was to be shut off, scientific activity within the lab would stop. Technological devices are a necessary part of scientific activity among scientists today.

Interestingly, technological devices and their use is intimately entangled with human devices. To illustrate this consider the following: Before a statement is deemed true, consensus regarding what counts as a proper experimental device must be made. Without consensus, any scientist can claim that their results obtained by way of technological devices accurately represent reality. Consensus is negotiated using human and technological devices. Negotiations are made regarding which set of experiments and instruments are competent. Various adjustments are made to methodology, standards, and instrumentation. Collins illustrates this process in his work The Seven Sexes. In this work, Collins describes what he calls the enculturational model. Through this model, knowledge regarding instrumentation is passed down through enculturation. He writes that the only criterion to establish that the knowledge necessary to conduct a proper experiment with the competent technological devices is that the experiment works. What counts as working is negotiated. Furthermore, in coming to a consensus through the process of negotiation, the character of the phenomenon that is under investigation is also decided (The Seven Sexes pg219). Once the phenomenon under investigation is decided, any other experimental devices used by others are deemed inadequate if they do not support the decided upon characterization of the phenomenon. In this way the claims made by scientist using different technological devices, which are always entangled with human devices, are unsubstantiated.

Latour in chapter 2 and 3 of Laboratory Life gives a similar account, but more interestingly he discusses how technological devices can lend validity to a claim. According to Latour’s naïve anthropologist and historian‘s deconstruction of a fact, the claims scientist make are all contingent on technological devices they use. The anthropologist describes in chapter 2 how the participants use specialized equipment to transform pieces of matter into written documents (LL pg51). The participants rewrite and edit the output of the recording equipment several times. The documents produced are then inserted within a larger network of actors (LL pg54). A document is said to be a fact or contain a fact when all the actors are convinced that there is no debate about the fact they are reading (LL pg 76).The process of constructing a fact, according to my interpretation of Latour, begins with technological devices and ends with technological devices. The construction of a fact begins with recording equipment described in chapter 2. In chapter 3, only after TRF(H) has been measured using another technological device, the mass-spectrometer (LL pg146), does it become a fact.

In using technological devices and human devices, the contextual dimensions discussed above are stripped away. Both kinds of devices function to produce claims/statements, allow scientist and their statements to compete with each other, defeat each other and remove the contextual dimensions that allowed the fact to be produced. The examples we discussed thus far exemplify how facts are produced and the contextual dimensions erased. For instance, by using technological devices to convert physical matter into output, a scientist can claim that personal bias was eliminated by using human devices. By using human devices that render the authors invisible, the social, political, and historical dimensions (e.g. previous research that was deemed irrelevant or invalid, but yet contributed to the production of the fact) that contributed to the production of a true statement in the form of a fact are erased.

One interpretation of Collins’ The Seven Sexes is that in deciding what the phenomena under investigation is, the nature of the phenomena is characterized and that characterization becomes fact because there is agreement regarding the nature of the phenomena. But what about truth? Does agreement somehow substantiate truth? Is the agreed upon characterization true? According to the common-man, a statement is said to be true when it corresponds to reality. According to this definition of truth there are several statements that can be said to be true, e.g. “you are reading this post” is a true statement because it corresponds to reality. A fact then can be said is a statement that scientist make which corresponds to reality. But which came first, reality or the fact? Was the statement “you are reading this paper” true before you read it? According to my interpretation of Collins, reality would have to come first.

Latour’s work in Laboratory Life takes a more radical step. Latour argues that once the phenomena under investigation is decided and it becomes a fact, nature itself is created. In a way this seems to imply that nature, science, and society are all co-constructed. Furthermore, the answer to the question asked regarding what came first, would be both because in the production of a fact, nature is produced as well. Latour’s answer seems better because it captures the phenomenon of the production of facts and reality more adequately. Before reading this post the statement “you are reading this post” is not true, but has the potential to be true. After reading the statement and the post in its entirety, the statement “you are reading this post” is still not true. Only in the act of rendering the statement true, does the reality become true (and vice versa). As soon as the facts change, the reality changes as well. Interestingly, this co-construction of nature and fact reinforce each other. In co-producing true statements in the form of a fact and nature, nature reinforces the true statement, and the true statement reinforces nature. In a sense, this is the last nail in the contextual dimensions’ coffin. Once “nature-and-true-statements” are produced, both the phenomenon in nature and the true statement work together to completely remove the contextual dimensions by appealing to the common-man‘s conception of truth. True statements in the form of facts correspond to a reality which is created by the production of the true statements in the form of facts. Ultimately, we end up with incontrovertible commonsensical facts such as “of course the world is made up of atoms”, “of course gravity exists”, “of course I believe in reality”, “of course demons aren’t real”, and yes “of course race is real”.

H. M. Collins (1975). The Seven Sexes: A Study in the Sociology of a Phenomenon, or the Replication of Experiments in Physics Sociology, 9 (2), 205-224 DOI: 10.1177/003803857500900202

“The subject of Tuhami’s tale is ontologically different from the subject of those tales with which we in the west are familiar. Generic differences are not simply formal differences. They are cultural constructs and reflect those most fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality, including the nature of the person and the nature of language” (pg 7).

After reading Crapanzano’s book, I found myself searching for the ontological differences and what or who the subject of his (who exactly the “his” indexes to I leave open for discussion) story is.

Throughout the book, we are described fantastic tales of struggle against demonic forces or against oneself. Typically, we (again who “we” refers to is left open—is it “westerners”, all of humanity, the theorist, the reader, etc..) think of demonic forces in terms of ontology in two possible ways. The first is that they absolutely exist, the second is that they absolutely do not exist. The dichotomy is testimony to the western abandonment of the supernatural for a reductionist approach motivated by the search for scientific objectivity. I ask myself which is true for Tuhami and which is true for Crapanazno, or rather for myself. I believe that they are indeed real for Tuhami. Demons are absolutely real and serve as objects in Tuhami’s ontology. For Crapanzano, they are “symbolic-interpretive elements” (pg75), they are explanations, and have no ontological reality, or better objectivity.

Interestingly, Crapanzano writes, “Tuhami had been speaking the truth from the start…” (pg 130). It seems that from the beginning we see an inescapable truth. The truth is we cannot escape ourselves. We are subject to our own cultural constructs, which we have very little control over. Heidegger put it best when he said that we find ourselves thrown into the world. We don’t really have control of what our world is, we simply find ourselves thrown into it, and have to make do. We find this throwness (as Heidegger put it) evident in the fact that we cannot seem to know that demons are real, as opposed to can be real, ontological objects. Instead, its very natural that we simply brush aside the notion that they are absolutely real for Tuhami, and instead fall back to theorizing and our fundamental assumptions about the nature of reality. In a sense, we stop ourselves from knowing, and compromise with understanding. We are inescapably stuck in our way of seeing, speaking, listening, interpreting, and understanding. The walls that create the constructs of our understanding are the things that make us who we are. Consequently, we cannot escape ourselves and are limited to an epistemology of self. Knowledge outside oneself seems inaccessible.

The most we can do is understand (never really know), as Crapanzano does when he writes that

“… the real was a metaphor for the true– and not identical with it. Tuhami had been speaking the truth from the very start…, but I had been listening only for the real, which I mistook for the true“ (pg 130).

Parting from Crapanzano, can we say that Tuhami had been speaking the real and the true, only the real for Tuhami was not real for Crapanzano? The real was not real, or at least real and not-real (in true Platonic fashion), for Crapanzano because it was foreign to the contextual framework he was working within. Demons are real for Tuhami and thus he has access to knowledge about them we are unable to have. For Crapanzano the only sense in which they are real is that they are symbolic-interpretive elements, and can only be understood as such.

In addition, we see that Crapanzano himself fears the notion that there are other equally successful ways of constituting reality. He writes that such a notion “is always threatening” and that “it may produce a sort of epistemological vertigo and demand a position of extreme cultural relativism” (pg 8). Crapanzano writes that his work is a reaction to anthropology’s failed attempts to deal with the matter. Yet, latter we find that Crapanzano ends up saying that even his own relativism has its limits (pg 133).

In coming full circle now, we can try to answer the questions posed earlier: what or who is the subject? Is the subject of Tuhami’s tales himself? He is. The stories Tuhami tells are stories about she-demons, but they are also stories about seduction, captivation, enslavement, identity, etc… Such themes apply directly to Tuhami. So the subject of Tuhami’s stories is ontologically different because Tuhami’s ontology is different from the west. Within his world, demons are ontologically objective, much like atoms are ontologically objective for a physcist. However, the subject of the stories told by Tuhami and the text constructed by Crapanzano is also Crapanzano himself. Crapanzano gives us a description of his reading and his notes. We gain our own insight into Crapanzano’s reactions to Tuhami’s stories, his insights, views, ideas, biases, etc… So Crapanzano is very much the subject of his own work as well. Additionally, what I consider one of the stronger points of the book, is that anyone can bring to the reading what ever they will. Ethnography, for me at least, is a way of exploring, not only the intended subject, but myself as well. Due to this, we are also given the chance to become the subject of the book, and in general ethnography itself.

In being the subject of this text (my text or Crapanzano’s), I ask can we question our own fundamental beliefs about the nature of reality, or in other words are demons real for you?

Often times the word social construct is thrown around in various theoretical and general works without ever being defined or discussed. However, understanding what is meant by race as a social construct is vital to understanding the capacity race has to intersect and affect other aspects and domains of life and society, as well as how to dismantle it.

To begin, a social construct is ontologically subjective, but epistemologically objective. It is ontologically subjective in that the construction and continued existence of social constructs are contingent on social groups and their collective agreement, imposition, and acceptance of such constructions (for more on the notion of social constructions see The Construction of Social Reality by John Searle). There is nothing absolute or real about social constructions in the same way as there is something absolute and real about rocks, rivers, mountains, and in general the objects examined by physics. For example, the existence of a mountain is not contingent on collective acceptance, imposition, or agreement. A mountain will exist regardless of people thinking, agreeing or accepting that it does exist. Unlike a mountain, the existence of race requires that people collectively agree and accept that it does exist. Franz Boas, a physicist by training, supports this view of race best in his work Race, Language, and Culture where he observes that there is nothing biologically real about race. There is nothing that we have identified as race that exists apart from our collective agreement, acceptance, and imposition of its existence.

Race, although it does not exist in the world in any ontologically objective way, it still is real in society (as opposed to nature). Race is a social construction that has real consequences and effects. These effects, consequences and the notion that race is ontologically subjective is epistemologically objective. We know that race is something that is real in society, and that it shapes the way we see ourselves and others. Many rightly claim that race is conceptually unstable. However, this should not lead us to skepticism about race, i.e. that we cannot have any objective knowledge about race. We can know what race is and how it works regardless of the various shifts in meaning that have occurred through history and occur geographically.

The notion of race as a social construct I am proposing is partially captured by various works. In Takaki’s work A Different Mirror: A history of Multicultural America, race is a social construct produced by the dominant group in society and their power to define. In other words, the dominant group in society imposed the boundaries of group membership by defining race in terms of biology. If you were black, then you were biologically inferior to a white person. Takaki explains that Africans in America were first brought to America as indentured servants. After completing the terms of their servitude they were freed, and had the status of free men. The color line at the time had not been drawn. Nonetheless, with the growing population of free Africans in America, fear of losing hegemonic control began to spread through the white population. Due to this, race as a biological concept was developed and used to justify the enslavement of a growing free black population early in U.S. history. This initial biological understanding of race helped draw the color line. The boundaries of group membership were marked by skin color. Till this day the primary race indicator is skin color.

Frankenberg in her work The Social Construction of Whiteness expands on what race indicators and hence race identify today. She simply explains that race is an indicator of difference, but an indicator of what kind of difference she does not say. As we have seen through Boas’s work, there are no biological differences between different “races”. Additionally, race does not identify differences in culture and is always loosely connected to biology. According to Frankenberg culture is unbounded. We cannot conclusively say on the basis of skin color that someone participates in white, or black cultural practices (although many people still do). This notion of unbounded cultural practices is exemplified in Gary Taylor’s piece White Noise: What Eminem Can Tell Us About White America, where he describes a white man (Eminem) in the hip-hop culture. George Lipsitz in his work Lean on Me: Beyond Identity Politics also discusses how Joe Clark, a black man, engages in a form of racism that perpetuates white privilege and supremacy.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s work White Negroes, suggests that the difference Frankenberg speaks of is one of status. The meaning of race developed so far with Takaki, Boas, Frankenberg and now Pieterse suggests that race is a marker of status that includes or excludes one from broader social constructs and enables or disables certain powers. Race typically works through race indicators which are used to indicate which race you are, and consequently what sort of status you have in society, e.g. in President Jefferson’s time race indicated a status of slave or slave master. Since race and race indicators are collectively imposed and defined by the dominant group, so is one’s status. Additionally, since race is a social construct and is ontologically subjective, it continues to work only in virtue of collective agreement and acceptance. Many people may object that they are not part of the collective agreement and acceptance I am describing. Nonetheless, as Frankenberg discusses and admits she herself is evidence of, white people are often blind to racism and do not see the privileges they have due to their skin color. Regardless of white people being anti-racist, they participate within a racialized society which privileges them. As Frantz Fanon described in his book Black Skin, White Masks, many individuals may claim they are not racist while tacitly accept the dominant racist ideology by way of reaping the benefits coffered to them.

Let us summarize what we have said about what race is so far. First, race is a social construct contingent on collective acceptance, agreement, and imposition. Second, race has always been defined by the dominant group in society. Third, race indicates differences in status. The status indicated by which race you are, either includes or excludes one from broader social constructs, and disables or enables certain powers. To illustrate how this sort of understanding of race works let us look at the United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind case of 1923 and the United States v. Takao Ozawa case of 1922.

Thind, an Indian American man, filed for citizenship in the U.S. in 1923, and was denied on the basis of his not being white. The U.S. Supreme court found that while Indians were anthropologically categorized as Caucasian, the “understanding of the common man”, wrote Justice George Sutherland, “knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable and profound differences”. Hence, despite being Caucasian, what many in the past (and almost everyone today) believed to be white, Thind was denied his status as white. The effects of the Supreme Court’s ruling retroactively affected all Indians who had already been granted citizenship. In the Takao Ozawa case in 1922, Takao argued that based on scientific evidence, he was white. Nonetheless, Justice Sutherland argued that he was not Caucasian, and hence could not be white, and consequently denied his citizenship. The rulings denying Takao and Thind’s citizenship strengthened anti-Asian sentiment.

The above cases demonstrate a profound kind of contradiction. The cases demonstrate a contradiction that was overlooked regardless of how obvious it was. Thind was not granted citizenship because he was not white, regardless of being Caucasian, and Ozawa was denied citizenship for not being Caucasian, despite being white. What allowed for this contradictory position to be maintained was the Supreme Court’s dominant status. The power Takaki describes is evident in the courts ruling. The common “white” man, and his status as dominant, allowed him to define the parameters of race, despite contradictions. As a result, Thind and Ozawa were excluded. By being excluded, by way of being denied citizenship, all the various powers enabled by the status of U.S. Citizen were disabled. Such powers included the right to vote, run for political office, and various other legal powers. In addition, other powers that are not as codified or legal, such as access to work unions, certain academic institutions, and certain neighborhoods were also disabled. The effects of the Supreme Court’s ruling trickled down and strengthened racist immigration policies, e.g. the Asian Exclusion Act of 1924, as well as affecting the lives of people of color in general.

The above contradiction points out how racist thinking has little to do with skin color, and much to do with status, power and fear. Roediger’s work Working Towards Whiteness exemplifies this point by showing how new immigrants, initially identified as “not white” but with an in-between status (regardless of having white skin), gained a new status (of white) and consequently- power. As we can see from the above cases and analysis, race is consistently utilized to maintain and control power due to fear of losing power and the current dominant position. Oddly enough, the ideology of white supremacy is inspired and maintained due to fear.

W.E.B. Du Bois in his work The Souls of White Folk questioned what it is about whiteness, that enables white men to commit crimes and not be condemned. In other words, he questioned why in virtue of being white, does a person have certain powers. With the analysis we have developed so far, we can answer Du Bois’s question. The answer is there is nothing inherent or intrinsic about white skin that enables white men to commit crimes and not be condemned. What enables white men to do so, is the structure of society in which they live. As we have seen, there is nothing ontologically objective about race and intrinsic or inherent in white skin that makes white people dominant. If there was, race would not be as fluid and unstable, and Thind or Ozawa would have been granted citizenship. Race and status are defined by the dominant group in society politically, economically, socio-culturally, and historically. The process of defining is made possible due to collective acceptance, agreement, and imposition. Additionally, the definition produced by the dominant group in society is constituted by collective acceptance, agreement, and imposition.

Frantz Fanon and his notion of socio-therapy, as developed in Black Skin, White Masks, advises that in order for racism to cease, society must abandon the notion of race. Fanon believed that only after society had realized that race is not real, would it overcome racism. Fanon is logically correct in assuming that racism will end when we no longer see through a racial lens, yet he is wrong in assuming that race is not real and that removing the lens is possible. To illustrate how he is wrong, take for instance Russell Simmons’ position towards homophobia and sexism in hip-hop. Simmons’ position is similar to Fanons. Simmons believes that by eliminating the words “nigger”, “bitch”, and “hoe” from hip-hop, it will solve the problem of homophobia and sexism within hip-hop culture. This is obviously misdirected because it simply evades the root of the problem. Frankenberg’s notion of power-evasive racist discourse can directly critique both Simmons and Fanon.

Thus far, I have repeatedly said that social constructs are contingent on collective acceptance, agreement, and imposition. It seems only natural to suppose that race will disappear altogether, as Fanon had hoped, once society stops collectively agreeing, accepting, and continuously imposing the notion of race. Nonetheless, this is a naïve supposition. Racism is engrained not only in the minds of people, but in the structure of society itself. Our legal system, our prison system, our educational system, our housing system, and various other aspects of society are all racialized. Take for example, Roediger’s assessment of the housing market after the Federal Housing Act in the 1930’s. Roediger shows how even capitalism–a layer in the foundation of U.S. democracy–is racialized by showing that the value of neighborhoods decreased and increased according to how it was racially organized. The more black people lived in a neighborhood the more the value of homes in that neighborhood would decrease. Abandoning the notion of race is not the solution to racism and white privilege. No matter how much we may attempt to make our legal language and documents racially neutral, race will always remain in the minds of people. Frankenberg’s notion of race cognizance seems to be a more viable and productive option. At the least, we have to come to terms with race, not abandon it but be aware of it, and understand it. Nonetheless, the general idea expressed in Fanon’s notion of socio-therapy (change society to cure the patient) seems to be correct. However, the change is not the abandonment of race, but instead a paradigm shift, or a revolution in the way race and differences are understood.